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Abstract   
In this paper we have tried to find an answer to the question: does the prohibition of non-audit services affect the 
audit quality and audit fees in Bangladesh. A questionnaire survey was used to pick-up opinions from a sample 
of auditors who are working at Big-4 and non-Big-4 audit firms. The results suggest that preventing joint NAS 
and audit services will lead to the decrease in the number of auditors who provide audit services and hence audit 
fees would increase. Furthermore, auditors select NAS on the account of audit services due to the less effort 
required and the higher income gained. It is expected that audit services will be carried out by small audit firms 
of less experienced and unqualified staff. Demographics as auditors’ academic degree and experience have 
influenced the respondent auditors’ perceptions on some of the questions. It was found that type of audit firm has 
no impact on auditors’ perceptions, where all auditors expressed the same views on the impact of the NAS on 
the audit fees and the audit quality.  It is hope that the findings of this study would pave the way for policy 
setters to find out the mechanisms that would help in controlling audit fees and ensure a high level of audit 
quality in the audit market of Bangladesh.   
Keywords: Auditing, non-audit services, audit quality, audit fees, Bangladesh  
  
1. Introduction  
In the light of the major corporate scandals at the beginning of this century, the issues of auditor fees and quality 
and the provision of non-audit services have attracted considerable attention and become the focus of much 
debate. Several countries moved swiftly to pass legislation to curtail or eliminate many auditors provided non-
audit services and imposed compulsory auditor rotation. Such legislation has, in effect, reduced the auditor-client 
relationship, although it may potentially raise the cost to an auditor of expressing an independent opinion. As a 
result, questions have been raised about whether the regulators’ actions were justified, and whether a company 
should be forced to replace the auditor on a regular basis, or whether the auditor should be allowed to build a 
long-term relationship with the client. 
Before the recent prohibition of certain types of non-audit services, auditors could perform different 
types of non-audit services for their public company clients in the U.S. It had been argued that the fees for non-
audit services had grown substantially and were more lucrative than the fees from audit services, thus 
strengthening the economic bond and substantially increasing the threat of impaired auditor independence. A 
number of regulatory bodies in the U.S. like the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Public 
Oversight Board (POB) and the AICPA recently asserted that significant high non-audit fees can adversely affect 
auditor independence and impair auditor decision making, especially when those decisions involve a substantial 
amount of professional judgment. Concerns over auditor independence and the magnitude of non-audit services 
have led to the reporting of these fees for public companies in the U.S., beginning in 2001, although they had 
already been reported for many years in countries such as the U.K. and Australia. Given the interests and the 
importance of non-audit fees in terms of auditor independence, it is not surprising that several prior papers have 
examined this issue.  
According to Self-Determination Theory (SDT), rewards can be used to control the behavior of 
individuals as long as the individual expects to be rewarded and the rewards are administered in a high-pressure 
environment. We use this finding of STD to argue that when auditors are promised rewards in the form of future 
NAS fees, they are more likely to agree with the client and allow earnings management. We expect this 
relationship to be more salient in a high-pressured environment such as the period before SOX because 
according to anecdotal reports during this time many audit partners were effectively pressured by their firm’s 
upper management to grow the NAS business. 
In furtherance of the requirements of Section 201 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the Securities 
and Exchange Commission adopted final rules prohibiting, during audit professional engagement period, both 
U.D. and non-U.S. accounting firms from providing to their audit clients that are SEC reporting companies ten 
specific types of non-audit services or any non-audit services that impairs an accountant’s independence from its 
audit clients. The prohibition of specified non-audit services is categorized into three basic principles: 
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- An auditor cannot function in the role of management;  
- An auditor cannot audit its own work; and  
- An auditor cannot serve in an advocacy role for its client.   
It can be noted that an accountant’s independence would be impaired by engaging in the following 
prohibited non-audit services on behalf of an audit client:  
−  Bookkeeping or other services related to the audit client's statements. Accounting records or financial 
statements. 
−  Financial information systems design and implementation.  
−  Actuarial services.  
−  Internal audit outsourcing.  
−  Management functions.  
−  Human resources.  
−  Broker-dealer, investment adviser or investment banking services.  
−  Legal services.  
−  Expert services  
−  Tax services  
In Bangladesh, providing NAS is completely prohibited, where auditors are not allowed to provide 
NAS to their client who is engaged in an audit process as declared by the Saudi Organization of Certified Public 
Accountants (SOCPA) in Article No. 5. However, while the issue of non-audit services and its impact on audit 
profession has been examined in previous western studies, they concluded with inconsistent results. However, to 
the best of the author awareness, very few studies examine the impact of the prohibition of the NAS on audit 
quality and audit fees in Bangladesh. It is believed that this study would supplement the academia and literature 
by providing answers to the following research questions:  
RQ1: To what extent the audit quality is affected if the auditor prohibited from renders non-audit             
services?  
RQ2: Do preventing joint NAS and audit services would affect audit fees?            
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two discusses the background of the study and 
develops the hypotheses. The data analysis and discussion of findings are outlined section three. Conclusions 
and some future avenues for future research are presented in section four.  
 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development  
Recent studies on whether the provision of non-audit services impairs audit quality document mixed results, 
depending on the proxy for auditing quality used. In general, prior research suggests two opposing views with 
respect to the effect of auditor-provided NAS on audit quality. One view is that the provision of NAS could 
provide benefits for audit quality in the form of knowledge spillovers (Simunic 1984; Beck et al. 1988; Antle and 
Demski 1991). Specifically, NAS constitutes an important source of information that enriches auditor’s 
knowledge about the client’s operations beyond the knowledge gained simply through the audit process (Beck 
and Wu 2006). The incremental knowledge gained from NAS enables the auditor to perform the audit more 
efficiently and effectively. This view suggests that NAS enhances audit quality.  
However, increased efficiencies due to NAS provision could be detrimental to audit quality if the 
auditor appropriates cost savings from knowledge spillovers. This occurs because the appropriation of cost 
savings amounts to higher rents associated with NAS, hence bonding the auditor economically to the client 
(Beck et al. 1988; Levitt 2000). The economic bond enhances the risk that the auditor will favor a client’s 
financial reporting choices regardless of their merit in fear of losing the rents. Hence, NAS could impair an 
auditor’s independence, which in turn could negatively affect audit quality. It is primarily this perspective 
coupled with some anecdotal evidence that is used as a basis for a regulatory ban on auditor-provided NAS. For 
example, regulators point to the existence of high NAS fees paid to the auditor of Enron as the major instigator 
to blame for the audit failure. This casual observation is the premise for the banning of NAS contained within the 
Sarbanes Oxley of 2002. 
Extant research has consistently failed to find any compelling evidence that establishes a direct link 
between auditors provided NAS and poor audit quality. A handful of papers show some indirect evidence that 
the auditor-provided NAS is associated with poor financial reporting quality. For example, Frankel et al. (2002) 
shows that firms that purchase a high NAS from their auditor exhibit low quality financial reporting as measured 
by accruals and the propensity to meet or beat earnings. Similarly, Hoitash et al. (2005), Francis and Ke (2006), 
and Srinidhi and Gul (2007) find evidence of a negative association between NAS and financial reporting quality 
or perceptions of it. However, the findings of Frankel et al. (2002) are disputed in a follow-up paper by 
Ashbaugh et al. (2003) who find that the results are sample specific and do not hold under various sensitivity 
tests. Subsequent research continued to document a “no-effect” result and for the most part concludes that there 
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is no evidence that NAS impairs audit quality (Barkess and Simentt 1994; DeFond et al. 2002; Chaney and 
Philipich 2002; Raghunandan et al. 2003; Ruddock et al. 2006; Habib 2009). 
Eilifsen and Knivsflå (2008) examine investors’ perceptions about audit quality in the post-Enron 
years 2003-2006 in Norway. The results suggest that annual stock market returns are less responsive to reported 
earnings when auditors’ provision of non-audit services (NAS) to the reporting firms is relatively high. The 
negative effect on the earnings response coefficients is moderated if the audit is by a Big 4 firm. The adverse 
investor perceptions are driven by observations early in the period, especially 2003, a year with escalating 
scandals and severe criticism of the audit profession. The findings are consistent with the interpretation that 
regulatory initiatives and perhaps a refocus in the audit firms in the wake of the Enron scandal were instrumental 
in easing investors’ concerns of provision of the NAS to audit clients. 
Causholli et al. (2010) examine whether the prospect of future lucrative NAS contracts affects auditor 
judgment and leads to lower audit quality. They test the association between audit quality and future NAS fees 
for auditors that were under significant pressure to obtain NAS fees. The results reveal that future realized NAS 
fees are negatively related to both measures of audit quality; i.e., (1) the absolute value of performance-adjusted 
discretionary accruals and (2) earnings response on unexpected quarterly earnings.  
Research that is more recent has sought to gain a deeper understanding of the role of NAS in reporting 
quality by examining different types of NAS separately. Prior research suggests that because knowledge 
spillovers and economic bonding could co-exist, it might be difficult to disentangle each effect separately 
suggesting that it is important to identify conditions under which knowledge spillovers dominates economic 
bonding. For example, Beck et al. (1988) show that the effect of knowledge spillovers is greater if the auditor 
provides recurring NAS, because knowledge resulting from recurring NAS decrease start-up costs associated 
with an audit, hence reducing the value of the incumbency to the auditor (or increasing auditor independence). 
Despite the theoretical result, empirical results continue to be inconsistent. For example, while Kinney et al. 
(2004) and Gleason and Mills (2007) find evidence in support of tax services improving audit quality, Elder et al. 
(2008) and Paterson and Valencia (2011) find that provision of tax services is associated with lower audit quality.  
Son (2005) differentiates “actual” audit quality from “appearance” audit quality by testing possibility 
that investors' perception of audit quality may differ from actual audit quality. Furthermore, he tests impacts of 
the NAS on audit quality by comparing audit quality before and after Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), which 
prohibits auditors from providing most NAS to their audit clients. If passage of SOX does indeed improve audit 
quality, the most noteworthy effect should be present for those firms who previously purchased large amounts of 
NAS. The  empirical results of the study fail to find positive effects of NAS, through knowledge spillover, on 
audit quality, but find the negative effects of NAS as measured by both actual and appearance proxies of audit 
quality. With regard to tests for the effectiveness of prohibiting NAS, this study finds a moderate result that 
changes in financial reporting quality, after implementing SOX, vary depending on NAS purchases prior to the 
Act. However, there seems to be no difference in changes of perceived audit quality between firms with large 
NAS purchases and firms with small NAS purchases.  
On the other hand, the impact of the NAS on audit fees was subject to empirical research. For example 
Krishnan et al. (2005), Hope and Langli (2008), Lim and Tan (2008) and Gul et al. (2010). Krishnan et al. (2005) 
investigate the association between fee-based measures of NAS (non-audit fee ratio, the level of non-audit fees 
and unexpected nonaudit fees) and earnings response coefficients. Their results indicate negative investor 
perceptions of NAS, consistent with investors perceiving large purchases of NAS as impairing auditor 
independence. Such negative perceptions do not, however, extend to the total fees.  
Hope and Langli (2008) investigate the association between auditor fees, including NAS fees, and the 
auditors’ propensity to issue a modified going concern report using a large sample of private Norwegian firms 
for the period 1997-2002. They find no evidence that auditors compromise their objectivity through fee 
dependence. In a supplementary analysis, they also report that their result sustains using a sample of public 
companies listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) for the period 1997-2005. 
Lim and Tan (2008) posit that the effect of non-audit fees on audit quality is conditional on auditor 
industry specialization in that audit quality is less likely to be impaired in the case of industry specialist auditors 
providing non-audit services. Their premise is that industry specialist auditors are more likely to be concerned 
about reputation losses and litigation exposure, and to benefit from knowledge spillovers from the provision of 
non-audit services. They find some evidence that audit quality (as measured by increased propensity to issue 
going-concern opinion, increased propensity to miss analysts’ forecasts, as well as higher earnings-response 
coefficients) is less likely to be reduced for firms that acquire non-audit services from industry specialist auditors 
compared to non-specialist auditors. Implications are discussed.  
Gul et al. (2010) test whether high non-audit fees affect auditor independence, proxied by auditors’ 
propensity to issue a going concern modified audit opinions. Using U.S. data from 2000 to 2007, they find a non-
linear negative relationship between non-audit fees and auditors’ propensity to issue going concern audit 
opinions but this relationship only holds when audit tenure is long. Further analysis shows that the link between 
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non-audit fees, long tenure and the going concern audit opinion is, however, stronger for low quality auditors 
(proxied by non-Big 4 and industry non-specialist auditors). The findings are robust when controlling for 
unexpected fees and endogeneity among variables. They conclude that high non-audit fees are likely to affect 
auditor independence only when the auditor has a long tenure with the same client or when auditor quality is 
poor. 
In the light of the above discussion, it can be concluded that most prior research were carried out in 
developed countries. Hence, there is a need to examine the impact of the NAS on audit quality and audit fees in 
one of the emerging economies; Bangladesh, therefore, the following hypotheses are formulated:   
H1: Preventing joint NAS and audit services would reduce the audit quality.    
H2: Preventing joint NAS and audit engagement would lead to an increase of audit fees.   
 
3. Data Analysis and discussion of Findings  
3.1. Sample of the study  
The data used in this study are obtained from a sample of auditors who are practicing in audit firms in 
Bangladesh. A total of 220 questionnaires was distributed with a response rate of 27.2%, where 60 
questionnaires that are valid for the analysis were returned. The questionnaire comprises three sections. Section 
one contains some demographic information; section two includes questions on the impact of the NAS on audit 
fees, and section three composes questions on the impact of the NAS on audit quality.  The questionnaire was 
revised in the light of a feedback from professionals who are working at universities and audit firms. 
Respondents were asked to express their opinions on the effects of the NAS on audit fees and quality using a 
Liker Scale of five points ranging from 1 “strongly disagree” to five “strongly agree”. A test of reliability of 
measurement using the Cronbach Alpha was carried out to test the internal consistency of questions on the 
second and the third sections of the questionnaire. The result of the tests of consistency is 0.731, which is greater 
than 0.7 indicating acceptable internal consistency of measure of scale reliability used in this study (Sekaran, 
2000).   
 
3.2. Demographics  
Analyzing the first section of the questionnaire reveals the demographic background of the respondents, which 
are examined by looking at the following: (1) job title; (2) academic degree; (3) experience; (4) professional 
qualifications; and (5) type of audit firm.   
Figure 1 summarizes the job title of the respondents’ auditors.  Of the 60 auditors analyzed, eight 
auditors (13%) are partners; six auditors (10%) are managers; with the remaining forty-six auditors (67%) who is 
working as seniors in audit firms.  
  
Figure 1. The job title of the respondents’ auditors 
Respondents were requested to report their academic degree. The results reveal that all the auditors are 
holding  at least a bachelor's degree, where a total of 41 auditors (68.3 percent) have a bachelor's degree, 13 
auditors (21.6 percent) with a master's degree while 6 auditors (10 percent) holding a Doctorate degree. Auditors 
are varied in years of experience which are classified into three categories for the purpose of this research; less 
than five years, between 5 to 15 years, and above 15 years of work experience. The results suggest that a total of 
29 auditors (48.3 percent) have less than five years audit work experience, 17 auditors (28.3 percent) with 
experience between 5 to 15 years while 14 auditors (23.4 percent) have above 15 years of work experience. 
Figure 2 shows professional qualifications; where the sample auditors were asked to identify any 
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professional certificates they earned as Bangladesh Certified Public Accountant (SOCPA), Certified Public 
Accountant (CPA), Certified Internal Auditor (CIA), or other. As shown in Figure 2, a total of 19.3 per cent of 
auditors have SOCPA, 12.9 percent earned CPA, 8 percent holding CIA, and the rest 59.8 per cent have other 
professional certificates.  
 
Figure 2. Professional qualifications of the respondents’ auditors 
Respondents’ auditors are affiliated with several audit firms. The results reveal that 42 percent of the 
respondents are working with local audit firms and the remainder (58 percent) are associated with one of the 
Big-4 international affiliated firms.  
 
3.3. Auditors’ perceptions on impact of the prohibition of NAS on the audit quality  
The questionnaire was designed to test auditors’ perceptions on the impact of NAS on the audit quality, where 
preventing auditors to provide NAS jointly with audit engagement would let auditors to select NAS as it requires 
less time and efforts and at the same time yields a higher income in comparisons with audit engagement.   In 
such cases, qualified auditors would dismiss the audit market and the majority of audit would be carried out by 
small audit firms will less experience and less qualified and certified auditors, which in turn would affect the 
audit market and audit quality negatively.   
Respondents are requested to express their opinions on seven statements using a Likert-scale of 5 
points ranged from 1 “strongly disagree” to 5 “strongly agree”.  This study defines any factors with the mean 
values up to 2.0, at least “disagree” or “strongly disagree” upon; in the range of 2.1 to 3.0, are “uncertain” and 
3.1 or above indicating that the respondents either “agree” or “strongly agree” that NAS would impact the audit 
quality. The results in table 1 show that the average mean ranged from 2.85 to 3.37. The respondents express that 
preventing the external auditor from providing NAS will lead to the failure to be fully acquainted with the audit 
client’s activity and consequently less able to specialize in the client’s activity (statement 4, with a mean=2. 85). 
Respondents express that prohibiting of the external auditor to provide NAS will make it difficult to judge the 
client’s internal control system and this may affect the auditor’s opinion (statement 5, with a mean=2. 94). These 
results suggest that respondents’ auditors are in an early stage to express their opinions towards the impact of 
preventing NAS on the audit procedures, where they are uncertain of the likely impact on the outcome of the 
audit engagement. 
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Table 1. Impact of NAS on the audit quality   
  Descriptive 
Statistics 
 ANOVA Test 
  
Statements   
Mean STD 
Academic 
Degree 
Significant  
Level 
Experience 
Type 
of 
Audit 
Firm 
 Preventing the external auditors from providing NAS 
requires the auditor to expand the audit scope and exert 
more effort in it.   
3.19 1.099 .207 .870 .919 
Providing NAS by the external auditor will motivate him 
to assign a team with high qualifications to perform the 
audit tasks to this client.   
3.37 1.075 .281 .753 .568 
Preventing the external auditor from providing NAS will 
lead to the increase in the number of work hours and the 
effort necessary for performing the audit.   
3.10 1.044 .298 .112 .667 
Preventing the external auditor from providing NAS will 
lead to the failure to be fully acquainted with the audit 
client’s activity and consequently less able to specialize in 
the client’s activity.   
2.85 .989 .486 .853 .065 
Prohibiting the external auditor of providing NAS will 
make it difficult to judge the client’s internal control 
system and this may affect the auditor’s opinion.   
2.94 1.143 .141 .172 .269 
Preventing the external auditor from providing NAS will 
lead big audit firms to dismiss the audit market; hence 
small audit firms would engage in the audit market and 
affect the audit quality negatively.   
3.30 1.086 .721 .486 .078 
Providing NAS by the external auditor will reduce the 
likelihood of issuing a qualified audit report.   
3.48 1.170 .431 .723 .457 
* Significant at the 0.05 level  
Furthermore, the results in table 1 suggest that respondents’ editors have expressed their opinions on 
the impact of prohibition on the joint provision of the NAS and audit services on audit quality, where the mean 
value of the rest of the statements is exceeding 3.1. The respondents are agreed that preventing the external 
auditor from providing NAS will lead big audit firms to dismiss the audit market, hence small audit firms would 
engage in the audit market and impact the audit quality negatively (mean=3. 3), and providing NAS by the 
external auditor will reduce the likelihood of issuing a qualified audit report (mean=3. 48). The results suggest 
that a prohibition on the joint provision of NAS and audit services would impact the audit quality, where auditors 
will have relations with the client that add much pressure on his opinion, hence this might prevent him from 
issuing a qualified report on the believe that this might lead to losing his client. Accordingly, the first hypotheses 
is accepted where providing a joint NAS and audit services would reduce the audit quality.  
Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to determine whether auditors’ perceptions on the 
impact of NAS on the audit quality were influenced by demographic characteristics. As shown in table 1, it was 
found that academic degree, experience and type of audit firm have no impact on auditors’ perceptions, where all 
auditors expressed the same views on the impact of the NAS on the audit quality (all statements have p > .05).   
 
 3.4. Auditors’ perceptions on impact of NAS on audit fees   
The questionnaire was designed to test auditors’ perceptions on the impact of the NAS on audit fees. 
Respondents are requested to express their opinions on four statements using a Likert-scale of 5 points ranged 
from 1 “strongly disagree” to 5 “strongly agree”.  This study defines any factors with the mean values up to 2.0, 
at least “disagree” or “strongly disagree” upon; in the range of 2.1 to 3.0, are “uncertain” and 3.1 or above 
indicating that the respondents either “agree” or “strongly agree” that NAS would impact audit fees. The results 
in table 2 show that the average mean ranged from 2.74 to 3.93. The respondents express that providing NAS by 
the external auditor will lead to a reduction in udit fees (mean=2. 74), which indicate that they are uncertain that 
the NAS would likely would reduce the audit fees on the believe that the auditor is familiar with client activities 
and have access to internal information that will reduce the efforts required to conduct the audit process on a 
timely basis. 
Auditors express that the prohibiting of providing NAS by the external auditor will lead to the absence 
of any allowed discount for providing more than one service at the time (mean=3.24). Furthermore, preventing 
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the external auditor from NAS will lead to the decrease in the number of auditors who provide audit services and 
hence will lead to higher audit fees (mean=3.40), where auditors in the market should make the choice between 
providing audit services or NAS, consequently, the audit fees are most likely to be increased in the audit market. 
Respondents express their opinions and agree that NAS yields greater income in comparison with audit services 
(mean=3.92), this might be justified on the ground that NAS requires less time and efforts as auditors may carry 
out several services within a certain period of time that is required to carry out an audit engagement.  The results 
of table 3 suggest that the second hypothesis to be accepted, where preventing joint NAS and audit engagement 
would lead to an increase of audit fees. 
Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to determine whether auditors’ perceptions of the 
impact of NAS on the audit fees was influenced by demographic characteristics.  As shown in table 2, academic 
degree has an impact on auditors’ perceptions, where, Bachelors, Masters, and Doctorate holders have 
significantly different views on only one statement (statement 4 with p < .05). It was found also that experience 
has a significant impact on auditors’ perceptions on some statement related to the impact of the NAS on the audit 
fees at p < .05 (statements 1 and 2). Furthermore, It was found that type of audit firm has no impact on auditors’ 
perceptions, where all auditors expressed the same views on the impact of the NAS on the audit fees  
Table 2. Impact of NAS on the audit fees    
  Descriptive 
Statistics 
 ANOVA Test 
  
Statements   
Mean STD 
Academic 
Degree 
Significant  
Level 
Experience 
Type 
of 
Audit 
Firm 
Providing NAS by the external auditor will lead to a 
reduction in audit fees. 
2.74 1.159 .805 .049* .564 
Preventing the external auditor from NAS will lead to the 
decrease in the number of auditors who provide audit 
services and hence will lead to higher audit fees. 
3.40 0.896 .367 .027* .263 
NAS yields greater income in comparison with audit 
services. 
3.92 1.038 .293 .981 .481 
Prohibiting providing NAS by the external auditor will 
lead to the absence of any allowed discount for providing 
more than one service at the time. 
3.24 1.051 .022* .947 .926 
* Significant at the 0.05 level  
 
4. Conclusion and Directions for Further Research    
This study investigates whether the prohibition of NAS in Bangladesh would affect the Audit quality and audit 
fees.  The small number of prior studies carried out in emerging markets especially the Bangladesh motivates 
this study. Based on a survey questionnaire for a sample of auditors who are working at Big-4 and Non-Big4 
audit firms, the results suggest that auditors are able to define the impact of the prohibition of the NAS on audit 
quality and audit fees. Article No. 5 of the SOCPA has affected the profession significantly. It is expected that 
active audit firms in Bangladesh are trying to find a way to violate such prohibition, for example, audit firms 
might switch clients among them. Alternatively, the audit firm will choose to provide NAS and dismiss the audit 
engagements, where NAS requires shorter times and less effort, at the same time, they gained more income. If 
this choice widespread among audit firms, the audit processes would be carried out by smaller firms with limited 
audit quality. Otherwise, big audit firms, who prefer to be specialized in the audit process with high quality, 
would ask for high fees. However, the empirical results suggest that preventing joint NAS and audit services will 
lead to the decrease in the number of auditors who provide audit services and hence audit fees would increase. 
Furthermore, the NAS would affect the audit quality. Demographics of respondents’ auditors as auditors’ 
academic degree and experience have influenced the auditors’ perceptions but the type of audit firm has no 
impact on auditors’ perceptions, where all auditors expressed the same views on the impact of the NAS on the 
audit fees and the audit quality.  The main lessons driven from this study is that the SOCPA should give attention 
to Article NO.5, where such prohibition of NAS in Bangladesh does not exist across many countries as the US, 
the UK, Canada, Australia, or other GCC as  Kuwait, United Arab Emirates and Qatar, which have a similar 
economies, political and cultural environment. 
However, the findings of this study contribute to the literature of the impact of NAS in emerging 
economies, where it covers a new ground and provide some thought that might act as a vehicle to develop 
Article No. 5 of SOCPA and help policy setters to maintain good rules that guarantee better quality of audit 
services and non-audit services at a fair fee and maintain audit independence.   
Further research is required to examine the impact of Article No. 5 on the audit profession with 
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emphasis on client firms, to see the consequences of this prohibition on: (i) the audit fees, (ii) the audit quality, 
(iii) and the auditor independence. Consideration of industry type and audit specialization would enrich the 
outcomes of this line of research and pave the way for the development of the audit profession in Bangladesh. 
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